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Introduction
The annual Conference of the Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC 1992) and the Kyoto Protocol (COP20/
CMP10) in 2014 took place in Lima, Peru, from 1–12
December 2014. Its significance must be assessed in the
light of preparing the next annual conference in
November–December 2015 in Paris, which is supposed to
deliver a comprehensive climate agreement according to
the Durban Platform formulated 2011.
In the run-up to the conference some developments
had taken place that seemed to change the dynamics of the
process. Most importantly, the usual roles of the EU versus
the US and China were somehow reversed: the Union
adopted comparatively modest climate policies that fell
short of the level of ambition expected, whereas China and
the US in a surprise bilateral move had announced plans
that exceeded expectations. Notwithstanding the fact that
these plans were non-binding and not ambitious enough 
to keep emission levels below a safe level, the two largest
polluters did appear to represent the spearhead of climate
protection. This certainly lent much more credibility to 
the approach those countries advocated, which is charac-
terised by voluntary contributions instead of legally binding
commitments. It was also the first time ever the two largest
polluters presented such a major joint initiative, marking 
a widely applauded departure from their historical finger-
pointing.
The mood of most negotiators was therefore slightly
upbeat when they arrived in Lima. The Climate Summit 
initiated by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in Sept-
ember had demonstrated that climate change ranked
among the top priorities in world affairs. And the accom-
panying climate march in New York, which had attracted
400,000 people from all over the United States, had sent a
clear signal that people in the US were expecting their 
government to play a positive role in the negotiations. The
continued urgency of tackling climate change decisively 
was underlined by the 5th Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).2
Furthermore, the initial capitalisation of the Green Climate
Fund had almost reached the aimed-for target of at least
10 billion US$. All these developments pointed to a con-
structive conference in Lima, putting the negotiations on a
firm track towards adopting an agreement in Paris 2015.
However, after the first week in Lima it became clear
that COP20 would not enter the history of climate diplo-
macy as one of the more constructive meetings. The con-
ference was, despite the US/China announcements, charac-
terised by a continuing deep division between key players
and groups from the former so-called developed’ and
developing’ world (enshrined in the division of Annex I and
non-Annex I countries of the UNFCCC). This became
apparent especially in the discussions on differentiation and
the role of ‘loss and damage’ in the forthcoming agree-
ment, which pitted – as it did in the very old days – logger-
headed negotiators from each group against each other.
The negotiations thus took 32 hours longer than planned
and ended on Sunday morning at 1.22 am – a considerable
prolongation even for seasoned negotiators. More impor-
tantly, the conference failed almost completely to resolve
the tasks it was supposed to do in order to prepare the last
round of negotiations before COP21 in Paris in 2015.
In the final hours of Sunday morning the conference
thus adopted the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’ and
attached as an Annex the ‘Elements for a Draft Negotiating
Text’ that had been the subject of intense negotiations.3
The conference did so without narrowing down the con-
siderable number of multiple options, thus leaving the
negotiators with a formidable task to resolve these over
the next year. In the following sections we will provide a
first, quick and not comprehensive overview and assess-
ment of the most important issues under negotiation, a
more detailed report on the Institute website will follow in
February 2015.
Negotiating a new climate agreement
The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action (ADP) was at the centre of the negotia-
tions since it aims to develop ‘a protocol, another legal
instrument or agreed outcome with legal force under the
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Convention applicable to all Parties’, which is to be adopt-
ed at next year’s conference in Paris and to be implement-
ed from 2020. Several key issues needed to be clarified in
Lima, in particular how exactly countries will participate in
the new agreement, the differentiation among countries
and transparency. The 2013 conference in Warsaw had
decided that countries should submit their intended
nationally determined contributions (INDCs) to the Paris
agreement early in 2015, but had failed to provide further
guidance.
The Lima conference was therefore tasked with provid-
ing guidance on the scope of INDCs, what information
countries would be required to provide alongside their
INDCs to enable their assessment, whether there would
be an international review of the INDCs prior to the adop-
tion of the Paris agreement and what this assessment
would look like. In addition, the Lima conference was 
supposed to develop a first draft of a negotiating text for
the new agreement.
However, only very few of those tasks were actually
completed in Lima due to disagreements over the respec-
tive roles of the so-called ‘industrialised’ and ‘developing’
countries, which has plagued the climate regime from the
beginning. The traditional industrialised countries (listed in
Annex I of the UNFCCC) have been keen to break down
the so-called ‘firewall’, the clear distinction between Annex
I and non-Annex I countries (traditionally ‘developing coun-
tries’) that is laid down in the Framework Convention of
1992. They argue that this distinction is outdated since
many non-Annex I countries are nowadays wealthier than
many of the traditional industrialised countries and that
their contribution to global emissions has also grown 
rapidly. By contrast, in particular the ‘group of like-minded
developing countries (LMDCs)’, which includes China and
India, some other Asian countries such as Pakistan, OPEC
countries such as Saudi Arabia as well as the left-leaning
Latin American countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela,
have so far strongly resisted any explicit or implicit dissolu-
tion of the traditional distinction between the Annexes.
They have maintained that Annex I countries should con-
tinue to take the lead since they are the ones who caused
the climate problem, even nowadays have much larger eco-
nomic resources to do something about it, and have in the
view of the LMDCs so far mostly failed to do their duty in
terms of reducing their own emissions and in providing
support to non-Annex I countries.
In Lima, this traditional divide once again came to the
fore in a number of ways. Industrialised countries had held
that contributions should only address mitigation and that
all countries should be obliged to offer a mitigation contri-
bution. By contrast, many developing countries posited that
INDCs should also include adaptation and financial, tech-
nology and capacity building support from industrialised to
developing countries. They argued that the need to adapt
to the mounting impacts of climate change was substan-
tially taxing their resources, which were consequently not
available for emission reduction actions, and recalled Article
4 of the Convention, according to which efforts by devel-
oping countries depended on the extent to which indus-
trialised countries fulfilled their commitments to provide
support. Many developing countries also demanded speci-
fication of volumes and timetables for financial support,
which industrialised countries rejected pointing to the
budgetary prerogative of their parliaments. Industrialised
countries for their part demanded that the donor base
should be broadened and that all countries in a position to
do so should provide financial support to poorer countries.
While the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS), the
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Association 
of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States
(AILAC) agreed with industrialised countries that mitiga-
tion should be central to all countries’ INDCs, the LMDCs
maintained that non-Annex I countries should be allowed
to offer only adaptation contributions.
A second issue on which the divide between LMDCs
and most industrialised countries came to the fore was
information requirements for reporting INDCs: What kind
of accompanying information would countries need to 
submit alongside their intended contribution in order to
allow other countries (and the public in general) to assess
the INDCs? And, equally important, whether there would
be an assessment phase for the submitted information
under the UNFCCC in the run-up to Paris? The latter
would be important in order to assess whether the sum of
the INDCs would be sufficient to keep the world below
the 2°C target and whether individual countries’ INDCs
constituted a fair share. The LMDCs posited that the in-
formation requirements for industrialised and developing
countries should be differentiated and rejected any inter-
national assessment of developing countries’ contributions.
Most Annex I countries outside the EU suggested a short
review phase which would not be expected to signifi-
cantly change the proposed contributions. AILAC, AOSIS,
the EU and the LDCs proposed a more detailed ex-ante
review to assess if individual INDCs a countries’ fair share
of the overall effort and whether they were collectively suf-
ficient to achieve the below 2°C target. Already in Warsaw
the African Group had proposed an assessment based on
a principle-based equity reference framework to review
the adequacy of the proposed contributions in terms of
ambition, equity and fairness.
A further issue was whether particular groups of coun-
tries should be required to adopt particular types of con-
tributions. Developing countries demanded that industri-
alised countries should adopt legally binding economy-wide
emission reduction targets along the lines of the Kyoto
Protocol. Industrialised countries in turn maintained that all
major economies should be required to adopt economy-
wide targets, though in case of non-Annex I countries these
might be intensity-based rather than absolute targets, and
that over time all countries should aspire to adopting 
economy-wide absolute targets. AOSIS also stressed the
importance of mandatory mitigation contributions for all
major emitters. Brazil tried to find a middle ground by 
submitting a proposal for ‘concentric differentiation’. Brazil
envisaged a system of concentric circles, with Annex I
countries placed in the middle adopting economy-wide
absolute emission targets, and other countries placed in
outer circles depending on their respective responsibilities
and national capabilities and adopting intensity-based 
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targets, targets defined as a deviation from business as
usual, per capita targets, or individual actions.4
Further controversies revolved around the timeframe
of contributions. The EU, China and others argued that
contributions should have 2030 as the target date, high-
lighting the need to give long-term certainty to investors
and the effort required to prepare contributions. By con-
trast, AILAC, AOSIS, the LDCs, and the USA alongside 
with civil society groups organised in the Climate Action
Network called for five-year cycles in order to prevent a
lock-in of low ambition.
A further contentious issue was the scope of the 2015
agreement. Developing countries requested to treat adap-
tation and mitigation equally in the new agreement, some
of them suggested language on legal parity of the two 
topics. In particular AOSIS and the LDCs – the countries
most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change – also
requested specifically to reference loss and damage from
climate impacts that cannot be addressed by adaptation as
a stand-alone item (see also the section on loss and 
damage below). Industrialised countries were willing to
accept language on the crucial importance of adaptation
but rejected language on parity with mitigation. They also
continued to maintain their past position that loss and
damage should be addressed in the context of adaptation
instead of being treated as a separate element. Industrial-
ised countries are afraid that any opening of the loss and
damage issue might ultimately lead to being legally required
to pay compensation to developing countries for their past
GHG emissions and have hence tried to keep the profile of
this issue as low as possible.
As so often in the past, the decision finally adopted by
the conference was pared down to a bare minimum to
avoid issues of disagreement. The decision once again urges
developed countries to provide and mobilise enhanced
financial support. Instead of urging other countries in a
position to do so to also provide support, as Annex I 
countries had demanded, the decision only ‘recognises
complementary support by other Parties’.
Elements for a draft negotiating text are annexed to 
the decision and run to 39 pages with many alternative
options. The next ADP meeting (Ad Hoc Working Group
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action) in February
2015 will now have the task of turning this into a formal
negotiating text, which can be formally communicated to 
all Parties before May 2015. This is the deadline for the
adoption of a Protocol at the Paris conference six months
later – if a Protocol is the route Parties eventually decide
to follow. As noted above, the Durban Platform also leaves
open the option to adopt ‘another legal instrument or
agreed outcome with legal force’.
On loss and damage developing countries did not get
what they were fighting for since it is not listed as one of
the elements of the Paris agreement. Instead, the decision
only welcomes the progress made towards implementa-
tion of the Warsaw ‘International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts’ (more
see below).
As regards the scope of the INDCs, in addition to miti-
gation all Parties are explicitly invited to consider including
an adaptation component in their INDCs. The decision
does not require developed countries to also include finan-
cal commitments in their INDCs.
Concerning the level of the submitted INDCs, each
Party’s INDC is supposed to ‘represent a progression
beyond the current undertaking of that Party’. This formu-
lation is aimed at installing a ratchet mechanism, where
contributions are continually strengthened – and to pre-
vent backsliding behind Parties’ current pledges. However,
the Annex with the upfront information requirements did
not survive. The decision now only contains one paragraph
with some specifications. Instead of requiring Parties to
provide the listed information, the language is now formu-
lated in a non-binding manner (‘information to be provid-
ed by Parties . . . may include’), and the subsequent list is
much less detailed than the lost Annex. The list does not
require a common timeframe, is less specific on coverage,
assumptions and methods, and does not require informa-
tion on the intended use of markets nor specifications for
the treatment of land use, land-use change and forestry.
The decision also does not foresee any international
assessment of individual INDCs. Only the aggregate level of
effort will be assessed, in a synthesis report to be prepared
by the Secretariat by 1 November 2015. Since this is only
one month before the Paris conference, any subsequent
changes to the INDCs are highly unlikely.
Enhancing short-term ambition before 2020
In some contrast to the rather entrenched negotiations on
a new climate agreement outlined above, the atmosphere
in this part of the negotiations was much more con-
structive. The two ‘workstreams’ for the negotiations had
been the result of a compromise at COP17 in Durban
(2011): developing countries had agreed to the negotiating
of a new ‘comprehensive’ climate agreement under the
Convention for the time after 2020 (Workstream 1) –
comprehensive meaning that it would not only apply to
industrialised countries. Different from the Kyoto Protocol
this agreement would entail contributions by all countries,
varying only in their content but not in their legal form. On
the other side of the bargain, industrialised countries had
agreed to negotiations on how to increase the ambition 
of their own mitigation commitments for the time before
2020 (Workstream 2).
Hence, Workstream 2 (WS2) started out as a process
mainly to negotiate new and increased mitigation commit-
ments for Annex 1 countries. Urging for a rapid ratification
of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol
became a second task that was frequently put forward by
developing countries. This process so far has not been 
particularly successful: not one developed country has
increased its mitigation commitment when compared to
what had been communicated in the Cancún Agreements
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back in 2010. On the contrary, some countries such as
Japan and Australia have backtracked from earlier commit-
ments.
However, as a kind of compensation for this failure, the
nature of this Workstream has changed significantly and
some novel aspects to the negotiations have been added.
WS2 has become a forum of open exchange with a strong
push also for developing countries to increase their pre-
2020 mitigation ambition. With extensive rounds of tech-
nical expert meetings (TEMs), WS2 has established a mode
of collaboration new to the UNFCCC process – a mode
which also allows actors from the sub-national level to 
contribute their experiences.
The big questions for the meeting in Lima were the fol-
lowing: would the innovative form of collaboration within
WS2 continue? And would it be possible to advance from
the exchange of information to a more action-oriented
approach, ie would it be possible to synthesise the out-
come of the TEMs and translate them into policy options
that are actually taken up by parties?
Given that the Paris agreement will probably not be 
sufficient to drive down greenhouse gas emissions to levels
compatible with the 2°C limit (let alone 1.5°C), a significant
mitigation gap will persist not only before 2020 but also
thereafter.  The necessity to continue the efforts for closing
this gap was apparent to all parties and they therefore
agreed to renew the mandate for the technical examina-
tion process. Some parties suggested that the mandate
should be provided until 2017 only. But finally, the ADP
reached a conclusion to provide for a mandate to con-
tinue the technical examination process between 2015 and
2020, but with an annual review of the progress of the
process.
Equally important for a constructive continuation of the
technical examination process is the more specific mandate
that parties provided for the TEMs. Until now, TEMs had
been very broad in content. In Lima parties agreed to built
on the results of earlier TEMs, to go into more detail and
to ‘focus on actionable policy options’.5 Furthermore, the
technical examination process will coordinate with other
existing activities such as the Technology Executive
Committee, the Climate Technology Centre and Network
(CTCN), the Durban Forum on capacity-building, the CDM
Executive Board and the operating entities of the Financial
Mechanism (GCF Board). This allows to make use of syn-
ergies and focuses the support, through the various mech-
anisms, on those instruments that have been highlighted 
by the technical examination process thus ensuring a pro-
liferation of best practice.
The decision also includes provisions for the last stage
in the process: implementing mitigation activities. Parties
agreed to ask the UNFCCC Secretariat to compile a syn-
thesis of the policy options including a summary for policy
makers. The idea is to formulate concrete policy options
that can then be picked up by policy makers and imple-
mented in their respective national contexts.
To encourage this kind of political action, parties en-
couraged the Executive Secretary and the President of the
Conference of the Parties to convene an annual high-level
event on enhancing implementation of climate action. COP
President Pulgar-Vidal had hosted a first such event in 
Lima. The event included contributions from a wide range
of stakeholders including a speech from the Secretary
General of the United Nations. Other contributions in-
cluded civil society representatives, sub-national govern-
ments and business representatives. The variety of contri-
butions was exceptional for a formal UNFCCC high-level
event.
In contrast to the lack of progress with respect to the
post-2020 agreement, discussions under Workstream 2 
can be considered more successful. The continuation of 
the TEMs and an improved focus towards implementation
is a very positive development. Negotiations under the
UNFCCC lag dramatically behind the reality. Positive devel-
opments such as the enormous digression of prices for
renewable energy technologies and their strong uptake not
only in industrialised but increasingly in emerging and
developing countries is a dynamic that has not yet spilled
over into the hallways of the COP venue. It is therefore
more urgent than ever to short-cut the feedback loops 
of this outside dynamic. An improved and continued
Workstream 2 could well be a place at which the positive
experiences with climate change mitigation can create 
resonance within the UNFCCC regime and create a
momentum for more ambitious mitigation commitments.
Loss and damage
In 2013, shortly before the COP, super-typhoon Haiyan
wreaked havoc in the Philippines, destroying about one 
million houses and killing more than 7,000 people. This year,
in the first days of the climate conference, one million 
people fled from typhoon Hagupit into the hills in order 
to escape the forces of nature. It served as a stark reminder
that adaptation to the unavoidable impacts of climate
changes is, besides mitigation, the second pillar of the cli-
mate regime. And many developing countries meanwhile
demand that the compensation of loss and damage due to
climate change is recognised as a separate, third pillar. As it
becomes increasingly unlikely that the world will stay below
a 2°C temperature rise (annual mean globally), the ques-
tion of who pays for the impacts is gaining more and more
relevance.
COP19 last year in Warsaw had adopted the ‘Warsaw
international mechanism for loss and damage associated
with climate change impacts’ (WIM). COP20 in Lima ap-
proved the two-year workplan that had been developed in
the meantime and decided on the permanent structure
and composition of the Executive Committee of the WIM.
It will be composed of 10 members from Annex I coun-
tries (traditionally those providing the financial resources)
and 10 members from other countries. Demands for a
majority of seats for developing countries suffering from
the impacts of climate change were not successful.
But the main fight over the issue of loss and damage
concerned the demand of developing countries, especially
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the AOSIS and the most vulnerable countries, to include
loss and damage into the workplan for the Paris agreement
next year. This turned loss and damage into a crunch issue
in the final hours and was resolved by way of a typical 
compromise: the issue is not mentioned in the operative
paragraphs of the Lima ‘Call for Climate Action’ nor in the
‘elements’ paper attached to it, but instead found its way
into the preambular paragraphs of the Lima Call (‘. . . wel-
coming the progress (on the issue) made in Lima . . .’). The
press release of the LDC Group after COP20 makes clear
that this reference is regarded as a ‘clear intention that the
protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome
with legal force to be adopted in Paris will properly, effec-
tively and progressively address loss and damage in these
respective legal options’.6 Some major struggles appear to
be looming ahead before and in Paris next year . . .
Finance
Financing climate actions and low-carbon development is
regularly a major point of contention within the climate
negotiations. With developed countries having jointly com-
mitted to mobilising US$100 billion per year starting in
2020, expectations on deliverance are understandably high
in developing countries. However, a definite roadmap for
upscaling current levels of funding was hoped for in order
to strengthen trust that such levels of funding would be
reached within the required timescales.
Pledges made to the Green Climate Fund (GCF) at a
high-level conference convened by UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon had amounted to slightly below US$10 
billion. The GCF had originally called for countries to pledge
up to US$15 billion as initial funding for the GCF’s initial
period (2015–2018), but had lowered its call to US$10 
billion in September. During the second week in Lima,
more countries came forward to the GCF with finance
pledges. With about US$10.2 billion by 27 countries,
pledges now exceed the target the GCF had aimed for. In
an unprecedented move, seven developing countries have
also pledged funding for the GCF: Peru, Panama, Colombia,
Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Mongolia.
Another positive note was struck by Germany. While 
in 2013 the Adaptation Fund had struggled to collect
US$100 million to be able to continue its operation, in
Lima Germany at one stroke contributed three quarters of
this year’s US$80 million fundraising target.
However, to think that this would be a sign of a break-
down of the ‘firewall’ between developed and developing
countries in commitments would prove to be very wrong.
Developed countries held their ground to keep any men-
tion of a roadmap for upscaling climate finance to the 
envisioned US$100 billion out of the decision on long-term
finance – a major disappointment for developing countries
hoping for a reassurance that promised finance would 
actually be forthcoming.7 Developed countries’ biennial
update reports on upscaling climate finance could be 
used to define elements of a pathway, but the language is
weak.8
Within the negotiations on finance elements in the Paris
agreement, the divisions between the country groupings
remained. Negotiators speaking for the Like-Minded
Developing Countries, the African Group, and the G77/
China strongly opposed calling for ‘all’ countries to mobilise
climate finance. Negotiators for developed countries,
including the EU and the US, stressed the need to reflect
evolving capabilities and responsibilities of all countries. 
This kind of polar opposition between standpoints will 
certainly be very hard to resolve in the continuing negoti-
ations for a Paris deal.
Monitoring, reporting and verification
Some positive developments regarding the monitoring,
reporting and verification (MRV) of Parties’ efforts can be
reported from the multilateral assessments of Annex I 
parties’ pre-2020 mitigation efforts as part of the Inter-
national Assessment and Review (IAR). With the aim of
increasing transparency as well as comparability, the historic
first session assessing developed countries’ first Biennial
Review reports took place on Saturday and Monday, 6 and
8 December. In total, the European Union and 16 devel-
oped countries were assessed (Austria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxemburg, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United States).
After a brief overview of the country’s efforts regard-
ing the mitigation of emissions and progress towards their
emission reduction targets, Parties had the opportunity 
to pose questions to the presenting country. This oppor-
tunity was taken up by many Parties and most questions
could be answered to the satisfaction of the questioner. 
At some points in the session, however, Parties criticised a
lack of detail regarding the information provided and Brazil
stressed that the use of different metrics across countries
complicated the comparison of the countries’ efforts.
Nevertheless, before and after the session, Parties as
well as observer organisations stressed the importance of
the multilateral assessments in building confidence and
trust among Parties for future negotiations on the 2015
agreement.
Carbon markets
The negotiations on future carbon markets came to vir-
tual standstill in Lima. A group of countries led by Brazil 
and China blocked any further discussions on the issues of
the new market mechanism (NMM) and the framework
for various approaches (FVA),9 arguing that negotiating
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concrete modalities and procedures for the NMM and
defining the scope and purpose of the FVA would effec-
tively prejudge an outcome of the ADP process on a future
climate agreement. Without a clear mandate as to what
role market-based mitigation instruments will play under
the new agreement, these countries were not prepared to
continue discussions. This position was strongly contested
by others, including the EU, the Umbrella Group and the
Environmental Integrity Group. In their views, the discus-
sions on NMM and FVA historically predates the Durban
process and should hence be continued independently
from it.
While the position of Brazil, China and others does have
some justification, it is also likely that it is motivated to
some extent by tactical considerations. Brazil and China
may want to hold back the market discussions in order to
save them as a clean development mechanism bargaining
chip for last minute deals in Paris. Historically, the clean
development mechanism (CDM) had been created in just
such a last minute move in Kyoto in 1997.
Parties were also not able to build on the advance-
ments regarding CDM modalities and procedures that had
been achieved in the intersessional meeting of the sub-
sidiary bodies in June 2014. It was not possible to reach
consensus on how to proceed with those issues on which
disagreement prevails and discussions under this item
ended with the decision to continue negotiations at the
next meeting of the subsidiary body of implementation in
June 2015. The lack of progress further aggravates the 
crisis of international carbon markets in the framework of
the UNFCCC.
The necessity to reform the CDM was already iterated
by countries in their opening statements as well as in the
CMP plenary. The annual CDM guidance document focus-
es mainly on streamlining standards and procedures of 
the CDM project cycle. For example, revisions of baseline
and monitoring methodologies are now possible without
reference to a concrete project activity. Also, validations of
monitoring plans can now take place together with the first
verification of emissions reductions. The de-registration of
CDM project activities is now endorsed by the CMP. This
step is necessary in order to avoid the double counting 
of emissions reductions for CDM projects that intend to
qualify for the Chinese Certified Emissions Reductions
Scheme (CCER).
Negotiations on options for building a net mitigation
component into the CDM were not successful in reaching
an agreement among Parties. This would have meant a
departure from the current ‘zero-sum game’ concept of 
the mechanism, meaning that the exact amount of GHG
emissions in Annex I countries needs to be offset by GHG
reductions of the same amount in non-Annex I countries.
Options to go beyond this scenario, resulting in a net GHG
mitigation effect, could extend to conservative baselines,
shortened crediting periods, discounting and voluntary 
cancellation of CERs. However, though alternative text was
suggested and discussed line by line various times, the issue
could not be included in the final decision.
A further bone of contention centred on the monitor-
ing of sustainable development effects of CDM projects as
well as stakeholder consultation and the establishment of a
grievance mechanism. Currently, the use of the CDM
Executive Board’s sustainable development tool is volun-
tary. While particularly the EU and St Lucia made a strong
case for the monitoring of sustainable development effects
in the beginning, their proposals met with strong opposi-
tion from China, Brazil and India. In the end, most of the
text proposed on these issues was deleted as no consen-
sus could be found. The final decision merely requests the
Executive Board to ‘publish its procedure for dealing with
communications from stakeholders’.10
Assessment: what can we expect from
Paris, what do we need and are there ways
beyond Paris?
Overall, COP20 in Lima can be viewed rather critically, 
but it also marked a number of positive developments.
While it was dominated by the usual struggle between
industrialised and developing countries, these are not two
monolithic blocs anymore. Not only the most vulnerable
countries but also AILAC and Brazil put their mark on the
proceedings by submitting constructive proposals. The cap-
italisation of the Green Climate Fund was also supported
by a number of developing countries before and during the
conference. Apart from the emerging economies Mexico
and South Korea, this also included Indonesia, Columbia,
Mongolia, Panama, and Peru.
The debut of the multilateral assessment of indus-
trialised countries’ 2020 pledges struck another positive
note. Parties as well as observer organisations stressed the
importance of the assessments in building confidence and
trust among Parties for future negotiations on the 2015
agreement. The ADP Workstream 2 negotiations on en-
hancing pre-2020 ambition can also be considered success-
ful. The stalemate of the UNFCCC is increasingly out of
sync with positive developments on the ground such as the
enormous reduction of prices for renewable energy tech-
nologies and their strong uptake not only in industrialised
but increasingly in emerging and developing countries. 
The continuation of the technical expert meetings and 
an improved focus towards implementation under
Workstream 2 could well be a place at which such positive
experiences with climate change mitigation can create 
resonance within the UNFCCC regime and create a
momentum for more ambitious mitigation commitments.
Lima also carried out the main task it was supposed to
– it will ‘bring us to Paris’, as it was formulated afterwards
by the German Under-Secretary of State Jochen Flasbarth.
The ‘Lima Call’ also stipulates that there may be no back-
sliding of countries, their contributions to the Paris agree-
ment need to mark a progression beyond their current
undertakings. This is an important starting point for the 
discussions of what has been called a ratcheting-up mech-
anism, a mechanism which would ensure that in future 
iterations of the commitment cycle, parties will gradually
156 (2014) 26 ELM : THE CLIMATE CONFERENCE IN LIMA – FIRST ASSESSMENT : OTT ET AL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & MANAGEMENT PUBLISHED BY LAWTEXT PUBLISHING LIMITED
www.lawtext.com
10 Decision -/CMP.10 ‘Guidance relating to the clean development mecha-
nism’.
Article1_Ott et al_ELM Article template  13/02/2015  12:01  Page 156
increase the level of ambition of their mitigation commit-
ments. Of particular importance for such a mechanism is
that parties must not use the occasion of new commit-
ments to backtrack from their earlier commitments.
Provisions for such a mechanism are also included in the
‘Elements for a draft negotiation text’ that has been
attached to the ‘Lima Call for Climate Action’.
Not much more can be said, however, of the main task
relating to the new agreement. This is a pretty meagre
result, even compared with the already quite low expecta-
tions regarding the new Paris agreement. One should
remember that in contrast to the Kyoto Protocol with its
internationally negotiated and legally binding targets, the
negotiations at the moment centre around voluntary
pledges, of whatever kind, time-frame and period, which
will or will not be reviewed, and by whom is not clear.
This was called by some delegates a system of ‘pledge
and chat’ – one might even say ‘pledge and see what 
happens’. Even the most die-hard supporters of this system
are not arguing that it will close the ‘emissions gap’ – the
gap between the current pledges and the reductions
required to keep the world below 2°C warming. It has thus
become increasingly obvious that the UNFCCC regime as
it is designed now is not delivering what it is supposed to
do according to Article 2 – to prevent a dangerous anthro-
pogenic interference with the climate system.
It therefore appears to be necessary to supplement 
the system by forging an alliance of countries that want
substantial progress on climate protection – an alliance of
the ambitious, or a forerunner club.11 This could theor-
etically be done by way of a special protocol, but because
of the consensus rule governing the UNFCCC it can 
probably in practice only be established outside of the
regime. Such a club of forerunners could help to inject
some of the much-needed dynamic that is required to
bring the world onto a path compatible with its ecological
limits. It might also be the place where forerunners could
develop and gather practical experience with multi-
dimensional commitments that go beyond the narrow
focus on GHG emissions only. The EU with its integrated
2020 climate and energy package (20% renewables, 20%
GHG reduction, 20% increase in energy efficiency) is one
example for this approach.12
Even when assessed against only the low expectations,
COP20 in Lima did not fulfill many of them. It has neither
produced a time-table for the submission of INDCs, 
nor has it agreed on a communication format. Moreover,
regarding the contents of the INDCs, the Lima decision
brought about an absolute minimum of guidance only,
which will make it extremely difficult to compare and
assess the submissions of Parties. Also, the ex-ante ‘review’
part of the ‘pledge and review’ system was largely aban-
doned, which is going to make external assessment even
more complicated.
The Lima COP20 also did not agree on a common
timeframe for the INDCs. While the USA and others 
advocated for a 2025 timeframe, the EU, China and others
stuck to their position that INDCs should be referenced 
to 2030, despite the commonly shared expectation that
most INDCs will not be compatible with the 2°C target.
Another aspect is that one key function of the UNFCCC 
is to create moments of concentrated public attention 
and political pressure. It is doubtful whether events like 
the joint Sino-US announcement would be occurring if
there was not a new agreement to negotiate. In addition,
one may hope that the globally increasing share of renew-
able energies and other climate-friendly solutions will cre-
ate new momentum on the ground. These dynamics should
then be brought back into the UNFCCC, but this would
require having a political entry point, preferrably a new
round of negotiated contributions. If a climate club of 
forerunners was created, it would also require such an
entry point to stimulate the UNFCCC regime. The climate 
would certainly be much better served by having five-
year instead of ten-year intervals between such entry
points.
The EU and others suggest that these functions could
be fulfilled by complementing the 2030 timeframe with
interim reviews in order to strengthen the level of ambition
along the way, and the ‘elements text’ does contain options
for such a review and enhancement mechanism. However,
the experience has so far been that targets are unmove-
able once they have been set internationally. The EU itself
is the prime example, having achieved its 2020 target seven
years ahead of schedule but nonetheless being unwilling to
strengthen it. Experience suggests that contributions are
only negotiated in earnest when they expire and need to
be replaced with new ones. A 2025 timeframe as advo-
cated by the USA and others would therefore be a much
better guarantee against locking in insufficient levels of
ambition for a long time, and also much better for creating
entry points for new momentum. Paris should address this
omission left by Lima by specifying five-year cycles of con-
tributions.
All in all, the promise of fresh momentum, of changed
tides after the US-China announcement and the successful
capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund has not been
borne out. This became particularly visible in the removal
of loss and damage from the ADP decision, which many
perceived as a slap in the face for AOSIS and the LDCs.
Not engaging with the key demands of the poorest and
most vulnerable countries is surely not a way to revive the
Durban coalition of the EU, AOSIS, the LDCs and others
which extracted the mandate to start negotiations on the
2015 agreement from the reluctant trio of the US, China
and India.
In summary, the UNFCCC negotiations significantly 
trail behind the pace that is needed to achieve a mean-
ingful agreement in Paris. While everyone acknowledges
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that climate policy is widely off track, three years of ADP
negotiations have so far not had the result of narrowing
down the fundamental differences between countries, as
reflected in the ‘elements’ text with its myriad of options.
However, there is still one year and several rounds of nego-
tiations left until the Paris conference. Governments now
need to stop dragging their feet, pull up their socks and
turn their current snails’ pace into the sprint that will be
necessary to meet the finishing line.
The Wuppertal Institute will publish a more detailed analysis
of the conference on its website in February 2015.
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